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Incentives in Health: Different Prescriptions for Physicians and Patients
Abstract
Financial incentives abound in health care. They are found in the ways physicians are paid and in the ways
health insurance coverage, co-payments, and deductibles are structured for patients. The effects of these
incentives are often understood through conventional economic principles, with the assumption that
individuals are self-interest maximizers who respond directly to changes in incentives. In contrast, behavioral
economics imports insights from psychology and recognizes that individuals often do not respond to
incentives as rationally as they might. In some cases, individuals lack information, but in others, they just seem
to act contrary to their own known interests, for example, when they overeat, fail to take medication, or
neglect to wear seat belts.
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VIEWPOINT
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FINANCIAL INCENTIVES ABOUND IN HEALTH CARE. THEYare found in the ways physicians are paid and in theways health insurance coverage, co-payments, anddeductibles are structured for patients. The effects
of these incentives are often understood through conven-
tional economic principles, with the assumption that indi-
viduals are self-interest maximizers who respond directly
to changes in incentives. In contrast, behavioral econom-
ics imports insights from psychology and recognizes that
individuals often do not respond to incentives as rationally
as they might. In some cases, individuals lack information,
but in others, they just seem to act contrary to their own
known interests, for example, when they overeat, fail to take
medication, or neglect to wear seat belts.
Although sometimes caricatured as focusing exclusively
on human irrationality, behavioral economists recognize that
rationality is dependent on the person and the specific situ-
ation. Individuals tend to bemore economically rationalwhen
they are well educated, have good information about alter-
natives, make similar decisions repeatedly, receive clear and
rapid feedback on the consequences of those decisions, and
have the time and emotional distance to make decisions in
a deliberative and dispassionate fashion. Individuals tend
to be less economically rational when they are less edu-
cated, lack relevant expertise, do not receive feedback about
the decisions they make, and make decisions rapidly and
under the influence of strong emotions. This dichotomy is
relevant to informing thinking about the role of incentives
in medicine, particularly when considering how to reduce
widespread overuse of low-value services.
There is ample evidence that physicians, who typically
fulfill the criteria for being economically rational, are ex-
quisitely sensitive to the incentives they face. Physicians tend
to recommend tests and treatments that will provide them
with financial benefit. For example, oncologists who are re-
imbursed based on the chemotherapy drugs they provide
administer more of these drugs and concurrently, the more
expensive drugs.1 On average, compared to physicians paid
on a capitated basis, physicians paid for specific proce-
dures tend to recommend more of those procedures.2,3
Clearly, if the US health care system is to improve the value
of health care spending, it will have to do so, in part, by ex-
ploiting this very rationality of physicians and by moving
away from payment systems that contribute to excess use
of high-cost, low-value services.
Patients using health care services face a situation starkly
different from that of physicians. Patients tend to face id-
iosyncratic health issues, get relatively little useful feed-
back about the quality of medical decisions, and oftenmake
decisions when sick and, as a result, in a heightened emo-
tional state. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the behav-
ior of patients can be less than perfectly rational. It is diffi-
cult for a patient who is ill and vulnerable to balance the
costs and benefits of alternative tests or treatments in a ra-
tional, dispassionate fashion. These decisions are difficult
enough when patients are feeling well, as can be seen from
studies of health insurance decisions, which reveal thatmany
patients often do not choose insurance policies that pro-
vide the most extensive coverage at lowest cost.4 This is not
to say that patients are entirely irrational; for example, as
classical economic theory predicts, once patients meet their
insurance deductible amount, their readiness to use health
care services increases.5
What are the implications for health policy of the greater
degree of rationality displayed by physicians relative to pa-
tients? First, attempts to address issues of overuse of low-
value services should focusmainly on physicians rather than
patients. Insurance payments for services of low value should
be reduced. Given the fiscal consequences of poorly con-
trolled health care spending, it makes no sense to pay just
as much for services or procedures that are unnecessary as
those that are life saving. This approach need not affect phy-
sicians adversely; lower payment for low-value services could
be coupled with higher payment for high-value services in
situations of underuse of those high-value services.
At the same time, however, physician incentives must be
implemented carefully. Broadly based incentive schemes,
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such as capitated payment or fee for service, are blunt. Both
can perversely create unwanted results—too much care in
the case of fee-for-servicemedicine, and too little in the case
of capitation—with little regard to value. Although incen-
tive schemes can be made more complicated in an effort to
motivate desired and narrower patterns of practice, those
that are overly complicated are less likely to be effective.6
Moreover, research in psychology and behavioral econom-
ics shows that monetary incentives can crowd out nonma-
terialmotivations such as those inherent in the desire to con-
form to professional values.7 Financial incentives are not
meant to replace intrinsic professionalism, but no system
of reimbursement is incentive neutral. Incentive systems are
needed that are generally successful at achieving intended
consequences without creating new problems.
Second, although patients may be less ideal targets for in-
centive programs in general, consideration of who re-
sponds well to incentives and when suggests areas in which
they might be more or less constructively applied.
One straightforward implication of the greater rational-
ity shown by individuals facing repeated decisions is that
the role of patient cost sharing should be different in the
setting of chronic illnesses than in the setting of acute ill-
nesses. Patients with acute conditions are likely to con-
front unfamiliar and emotional decisions and are therefore
not appropriate targets of cost-sharing incentive programs
that require a dispassionate evaluation of costs and ben-
efits. In contrast, higher cost sharing for low-value services
can make more sense for patients with chronic conditions
who aremore likely to face similar decisions repeatedly. Al-
though studies of reduced cost sharing formedications based
on the value of medications find disappointingly small im-
provement in adherence at a relatively high cost (few pa-
tients who would not have otherwise taken the medication
take it, but many who would have taken it at the original
cost receive a discount),8 studies of increased cost sharing
consistently observe large reductions in utilization.9
A second implication of limited rationality on the part of
patients is that incentive programs targeting patient health
behaviors should be carefully designed. Section 2705 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act expands, to 30%
of total premiums, the proportion of employee health in-
surance premiums that can be conditioned on health out-
comes assessed by biometric measures such as low-density
lipoprotein cholesterol, blood pressure, body mass index,
and smoking status. A key question for these provisions,
about which there are limited data, is how much the be-
haviors these indicators measure can be modified through
premium-based health incentives. Employees who smoke
or are obese, who will end up paying the highest rates, tend
to be the poorest, leading to a situation in which the most
disadvantaged individuals and families will pay the highest
insurance premiums. The effect of incentives for behavior
change can be enhanced by implementation that accounts
for and leverages irrationalities in decisionmaking; in other
words,while adjusting the prices of insurancewill likely have
some influence on behavior, the effects achieved could po-
tentially be greater if the underlying psychology of deci-
sion making is considered in the design.10 If premiums tied
to outcomes succeed inmaking individuals healthier at high
rates, the health benefits may justify the increase in regres-
sivity, but programs will need to be designed carefully to
increase the likelihood that they will have a positive effect
on behavior.
There is an expression in economics: “There are no bad
people, only bad incentives.” Incentives have been and will
continue to be an inevitable part of health care financing
and can be used to increase the value health care spending
provides in improving health. But to achieve intended goals,
whileminimizing unintended consequences, the design and
implementation of incentives should consider how pa-
tients and physicians respond to these incentives and how
they respond differently in different circumstances.
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